

{TEXT OMITTED}

6. MARKET POWER MITIGATION

6.1 Applicability

The provisions of the Market Monitoring Plan in Attachment M to this Tariff and this section 6 shall apply to the Reliability Pricing Model Auctions. ~~In addition, PJM shall apply market power mitigation~~

~~measures, as set forth in this section 6, to any Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction for any Locational Deliverability Area having a Locational Price Adder greater than zero as determined by the optimization algorithm pursuant to section 5.12, but only in the event the Sell Offers that were accepted by such algorithm to resolve any locational constraint giving rise to the Locational Price Adder (and that would not have been accepted absent such constraint), and all Sell Offers that would resolve such constraint remaining available but unaccepted by such algorithm, collectively fail the Market Structure Screen set forth in this section 6. PJM shall also apply market power mitigation measures, as set forth in this section 6, to any Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction for the entire PJM Region. This section also specifies an offer requirement applicable to all Capacity Resources, regardless of Locational Deliverability Area.~~

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6.2 Process

(a) By no later than three months (or such other time period as established for purposes of the Transition Period) prior to the conduct of the Base Residual Auction and each Incremental Auction for such Delivery Year, the Office of the Interconnection shall post the results of the Market Monitoring Unit's application of the Preliminary Market Structure Screen set forth below ~~to each such LDA and to the entire PJM Region.~~

(b) In accordance with the schedule specified in the PJM Manuals, following PJM's conduct of a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction pursuant to section 5.12, but prior to PJM's final determination of clearing prices and charges pursuant to section 5.14, PJM shall: (i) apply the Market Structure Test to any LDA having a Locational Price Adder greater than zero and to the entire PJM region; (ii) apply Offer Caps, if required under this section 6; and (iii) recompute the optimization algorithm to clear the auction with the Offer Caps in place.

(c) Within seven days after the deadline for submission of Sell Offers in a Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction, the Office of the Interconnection shall file with FERC a report of any determination made pursuant to sections 5.14(h), 6.5(a)(ii), or 6.7(c) identified in such sections as subject to the procedures of this section. Such report shall list each such determination, the information considered in making each such determination, and an explanation of each such determination. Any entity that objects to any such determination may file a written objection with FERC no later than seven days after the filing of the report. Any such objection must not merely allege that the determination was in error, and must provide support for the objection, demonstrating that the determination overlooked or failed to consider relevant evidence. In the event that no objection is filed, the determination shall be final. In the event that an objection is filed, FERC shall issue any decision modifying the determination no later than 60 days after the filing of such report; otherwise, the determination shall be final. Final auction results shall reflect any decision made by FERC regarding the report.

6.3 Market Structure Tests

(a) Preliminary Market Structure Screen.

(i) In sufficient time to permit the posting required by section 6.2(a), the Market Monitoring Unit shall apply the Preliminary Market Structure Screen to identify the LDAs in which Capacity Market Sellers must provide the data specified in section 6.7(b) for any auction conducted with respect to such Delivery Year and whether Capacity Market Sellers must provide this data for the entire PJM Region. For each LDA and for the PJM Region, the Preliminary Market Structure Screen will be based on: (1) the Unforced Capacity available for such Delivery Year from Generation Capacity Resources located in such area; and (2) the Locational Deliverability Area Reliability Requirement and the PJM Reliability Requirement. For purposes of this screen, any LDA for which a separate Variable Resource Requirement Curve has not been established under section 5.10 of this Attachment shall be combined with all other such LDAs that form an electrically contiguous area ("Unconstrained LDA Group"), and the screen shall be applied to such area in the aggregate, rather than to each such LDA

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individually. Any such Unconstrained LDA Groups shall be identified in the posting required by section 6.2(a).

(ii) An LDA, Unconstrained LDA Group, or the entire PJM Region shall fail the Preliminary Market Structure Screen, and Capacity Market Sellers owning or controlling any Generation Capacity Resource located in such LDA, Unconstrained LDA Group, or ~~the PJM Region~~ shall be required to provide the information specified in section 6.7, if any one of the following three conditions is met: (1) the market share of any Capacity Market Seller exceeds twenty percent; (2) the HHI for all such sellers is 1800 or higher; or (3) there are not more than three jointly pivotal suppliers.

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(b) Market Structure Test.

~~(i) In accordance with the schedule set under section 6.2, the Market Monitoring Unit shall apply the Market Structure Test to an LDA or the PJM Region if the conditions specified in section 6.5 are met as to such LDA.~~

(ii) ~~An constrained LDA, Unconstrained LDA Group, or the PJM Region shall fail the Market Structure Test, and mitigation shall be applied to all jointly pivotal suppliers (including all Affiliates of such suppliers, and all third-party supply in the relevant LDA or Unconstrained LDA Group controlled by such suppliers by contract), if, as to the Sell Offers that comprise the incremental supply as determined in section 6.3(c) described in section 6.1, there are not more than three jointly pivotal suppliers.~~

(c) Determination of Incremental Supply

In applying the ~~market structure screen and m~~Market ~~s~~Structure ~~t~~Test, the ~~Market Monitoring Unit~~Office of the Interconnection shall consider all (i) incremental supply, ~~up to and including all such supply~~ available to solve the constraint applicable to a constrained LDA, ~~offered at less than or equal to 150% of the cost-based clearing price or Unconstrained LDA Group, or (ii) supply for the PJM Region, offered at an effective cost~~ less than or equal to 150% of the cost-based clearing price, ~~provided that "supply" in this section includes only the lower of cost-based or price-based offers from Generation Capacity Resources calculated using the incremental megawatts of supply available to solve the constraint and the need for megawatts to solve the constraint giving rise to a Locational Price Adder. Cost-based clearing prices are the prices resulting from the RPM auction algorithm using the lower of cost-based or price-based offers for all Generation Capacity Resources.~~

6.4 Market Seller Offer Caps

(a) The Market Seller Offer Cap, stated in dollars per MW-~~day~~year, applicable to price-quantity offers within the Base Offer Segment for an existing Generation Capacity Resource shall be the Avoidable Cost Rate for such resource, less the Projected PJM Market Revenues for such resource. During the first three Delivery Years of the Transition Period, the Market Seller Offer Cap shall be increased for Sell Offers submitted by eligible Capacity Market Sellers in any Unconstrained LDA Group by the Transition Adder set forth in section 17.5 of this Attachment. The Market Seller Offer Cap for an existing Generation Capacity Resource shall be the Opportunity Cost for such resource, if applicable in accordance with section 6.7. Nothing herein shall preclude any Capacity Market Seller and the Market Monitoring Unit from agreeing to, nor require either such entity to agree to, an alternative market seller offer cap determined on a mutually agreeable basis. Any such alternative offer cap shall be filed with the FERC for its approval.

(b) For any Third Incremental Auction, the Market Seller Offer Cap for an existing Generation Capacity Resource shall be determined pursuant to paragraph (a) of this Section 6.4, or if elected by the Capacity Market Seller, shall be equal to 1.1 times the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in the Base Residual Auction for the relevant LDA and Delivery Year.

6.5 Mitigation

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The Office of the Interconnection shall apply market power mitigation measures into any Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction for any LDA, Unconstrained LDA Group, or the PJM Region that, ~~without mitigation, would have a Locational Price Adder greater than zero, but only in the event the cost-based Sell Offers that would be accepted by the optimization algorithm~~

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~~to resolve any locational constraint giving rise to the Locational Price Adder (and that would not have been accepted absent such constraint), and all cost based Sell Offers made at a price less than or equal to 150 percent of the clearing price determined by the optimization algorithm that would help resolve such constraint remaining available but unaccepted by such algorithm, collectively fail~~ the Market Structure Test.

- (a) Mitigation for Generation Capacity Resources.
 - i) Existing Generation Resource

Mitigation will be applied on a unit-specific basis and only if the Sell Offer of Unforced Capacity from a Generation Capacity Resource: (1) is greater than the Market Seller Offer Cap applicable to such resource; and (2) would, absent mitigation, increase the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in the relevant auction. If such conditions are met, such Sell Offer shall be set equal to the Market Seller Offer Cap.

- ii) Planned Generation Capacity Resources

(A) Sell Offers based on Planned Generation Capacity Resources (including External Planned Generation Capacity Resources) shall be presumed to be competitive and shall not be subject to market power mitigation in the Base Residual Auction or Incremental Auction for adjustment of committed capacity for the first Delivery Year for which such resource qualifies as a Planned Generation Capacity Resource, but any such Sell Offer shall be rejected if it meets the criteria set forth in subsection (C) below, unless the Capacity Market Seller obtains approval from FERC for use of such offer prior to the deadline for submission of such offers in the applicable auction. Such resources shall be treated as Existing Generation Capacity Resources in the auctions for any subsequent Delivery Year; provided, however, that such resources may receive certain price assurances for the two Delivery Years immediately following the first Delivery Year of service under certain conditions as set forth in section 5.14 of this Attachment.

(B) Sell Offers based on Planned Generation Capacity Resources (including External Planned Generation Capacity Resources) submitted for the first year in which such resources qualify as Planned Generation Capacity Resources shall be deemed competitive and not be subject to mitigation if: (1) collectively all such Sell Offers provide Unforced Capacity in an amount equal to or greater than two times the incremental quantity of new entry required to meet the LDA Reliability Requirement; and (2) at least two unaffiliated suppliers have submitted Sell Offers for Planned Generation Capacity Resources in such LDA. Notwithstanding the foregoing, any Capacity Market Seller, together with Affiliates, whose Sell Offers based on Planned Generation Capacity Resources in that LDA are pivotal, shall be subject to mitigation.

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(C) Where the two conditions stated in Paragraph (B) are not met, or the Sell Offer is pivotal, the Sell Offer shall be rejected if it exceeds 140 percent of: 1) the average of location-adjusted Sell Offers for Planned Generation Capacity Resources from the same asset class as such Sell Offer, submitted (and not rejected) (Asset-Class New Plant Offers) for such Delivery Year; or 2) if there are no Asset-Class New Plant Offers for such Delivery Year, the average of Asset-Class New Plant Offers for all prior Delivery Years; or 3) if there are no Asset-Class New Plant Offers for any prior Delivery Year, the Net CONE applicable for such Delivery Year in the LDA for which such offer was submitted. For purposes of this paragraph, asset classes shall be as stated in section 6.7(c) as effective for such Delivery Year, and Asset-Class New Plant Offers shall be location-adjusted by the ratio between the Net CONE effective for such Delivery Year for the LDA in which the Sell Offer subject to this paragraph was submitted and the average, weighted by installed capacity, of the Net CONEs for all LDAs in which the units underlying such Asset Class New Plant Offers are located. Following the conduct of the applicable auction and before the final determination of clearing prices, in accordance with Section 6.2(b) above, each Capacity Market Seller whose Sell Offer is so rejected shall be notified and allowed an opportunity to submit a revised Sell Offer that does not exceed such threshold. The Office of the Interconnection then shall clear the auction with such revised Sell Offer in place.

(b) Mitigation for Demand Resources

The Market Seller Offer Cap shall not be applied to Sell Offers of Planned Demand Resources or Energy Efficiency Resources. When the Market Structure Test is failed, any Sell Offers of existing Demand Resources or Energy Efficiency Resources shall not be considered in determining the Capacity Resource Clearing Price in any auction for the market for which such test was failed.

6.6 Offer Requirement for Capacity Resources

(a) To avoid application of subsection (d), all Unforced Capacity of all existing Generation Capacity Resources located in the PJM Region shall be offered (which may include submission as Self-Supply) in the Base Residual Auction for each Delivery Year, where Unforced Capacity is determined using an EFORD less than or equal to the greater of (i) the annual average EFORD for the five consecutive years ending on the September 30 that last precedes the submission of such offers or (ii) the EFORD for the 12 months ending on the September 30 that last precedes the submission of such offers.

(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing, if a Capacity Market Seller can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Office of the Interconnection and the PJM Market Monitor that the EFORD established pursuant to subsection (a) of this section does not accurately reflect the amount of its Unforced Capacity anticipated to be reliable in the relevant Delivery Year, the Market Seller shall be allowed to adjust the EFORD for its existing Generation Capacity Resources, provided that any such change shall be subject to approval by the Office of the Interconnection and the PJM Market Monitor.